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Abstract— In near future, the Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSN) is widely used in many applications 
like military and civil domains. The wireless sensor 
networks are always deployed in hostile and pervasive 
environment. Security is major concern in the wireless 
sensor network. The traditional network security 
methods are not suitable for wireless sensor networks 
because of limited resource. Several Key management 
and establishment schemes have been proposed to 
provide light weight ciphers. The key management 
schemes play an important role in wireless sensor 
networks to achieve security. In this paper a survey of 
key management schemes in wireless sensor networks 
has been executed. Each and every key management 
schemes has some trade off between limited resource 
and security. Classification of key management 
schemes based on encryption was done. Further based 
on key predistribution (with or without deployment 
knowledge) and rekeying mechanism, the key 
management schemes have been analysed and their 
limitations and advantages have been summarized. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent advances in MEMS technology, WSN 
play a vital role in an area of communication expressly 
to sense and report about antagonistic environment. 
The wireless sensor network consists of large number 
of tiny sensor nodes; each sensor node is equipped 
with integrated sensor, low battery powered and the 
main task of sensor node is sense, process the data and 
provide short range of communication. The sensor 
nodes are mainly deployed for military sensing and 
tracking an object, hostile environmental monitoring, 
patient monitoring, etc.  
When the sensor nodes are deployed in 
hostile environment the secure communication 
became extremely important, to survive the various 
types of malicious attacks. Security is provided by 
means of encryption and authentication in each 
communication between two nodes. The traditional 
cryptographic techniques are not suitable for WSN 
because of resources constraint. For example, the 
MICA2 mote consists of an 8 bit AT Mega 128L 
microcontroller, data rate of 250 Kbits/s, size of flash 
memory is only 512 Kbyte and on board battery is 3.3 
V with 2A-hr capacity [1]. These complications are 
overcome by means of basic fundamental scheme 
called key management schemes; it is specially 
designed for wireless sensor network.  
Recently various efficient key management 
schemes have been proposed to provide secure 
relation between neighbour sensors during network 
formation.  All these key management schemes have 
their own advantage and disadvantages. The 
influential factors are, 
 Scalability: Capability to increase the size of 
wireless sensor network. 
 Connectivity: Probability of sensor nodes can 
find a common secret key to establish secure 
communication.  
 Resilience: Resistance of the WSN against 
node capture. 
 Memory Overhead: Amount of memory unit 
needed to store security identifications. 
 Processing Overhead: Amount of processing 
cycle required by sensor node to generate a 
common secret key. 
 Communication Overhead: Amount and size 
of message needed to establish and generate a 
common key between two sensor nodes. 
A. Classification of Key Management Schemes 
Generally key management schemes are 
classified into many types. Depending upon 
encryption, it is classified into symmetric, asymmetric 
and hybrid key management scheme. Depending upon 
key predistribution it is classified into location 
dependent key predistribution and location 
independent key Predistribution .Key management 
Schemes can be further classified into Static and 
dynamic scheme based on whether rekeying is 
performed after deployment. In the Static key 
management scheme once the sensor nodes are 
deployed in the field, they will not change 
administrative keys are generated before deployment. 
In the dynamic key management schemes   may 
change its administrative keys periodically or on 
demand. The major advantage of dynamic key 
management scheme is enhanced network 
survivability and scalability. Depending upon the 
network model, it is classified into homogeneous or 
International Journal of Computer & Organization Trends –Volume 3 Issue 5 September to October 2013 
ISSN: 2249-2593                                  http://www.ijcotjournal.org                              Page 48 
heterogeneous schemes. Homogeneous schemes 
commonly a flat network model and all the sensor 
nodes are having same capabilities.  
The key management schemes needs four 
basic functions, specifically key examinations or key 
analysis, key assignment, key generation, and key 
Predistribution. These functions have been tightly 
coupled with one another and it is carried out by a 
centralized server or the cooperation of sensor nodes 
in the network. In this paper, the different key 
management schemes have been classified based on 
encryption and it is further classified based on key 
predistribution (with or without deployment 
knowledge) and rekeying mechanism.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
In section 2 details the symmetric key management 
schemes based on key predistribution and deployment 
knowledge. In section 3, we explain the Asymmetric 
key management scheme and its classifications. 
Finally we conclude this paper in Section 4. 
 
II. SYMMETRIC KEY MANAGEMENT 
SCHEMES 
Most of the traditional key management 
schemes are not suitable for wireless sensor network 
due to limited resource and energy constraint of the 
sensor node. The symmetric key management schemes 
are suitable for WSN because of limited computation, 
communication and memory. Based on the key 
management process (i.e., key analysis, key 
distribution, key discovery and key establishment) the 
symmetric key management schemes are introduced in 
the following subsections. 
A.  Master Key based pre-distribution Scheme 
          In the master key management scheme, a single 
key is preloaded into every sensor node before 
deployment. Lai et al. (2002) proposed a master key 
based pre-distribution scheme [2]. The master key is 
pre distributed into each sensor nodes. Once the sensor 
nodes are deployed in the field, a pair wise key can be 
established by using this master key and random 
number can be exchanged between sensor nodes. The 
advantage of this scheme is high scalability and 
memory is efficient but there is a lack of security. It 
requires a tamper resistant hardware for which the cost 
is more. It has poor resilience and authentication. 
         Zhu et al. (2003) proposed an improved scheme 
called LEAP: Localized Encryption and 
Authentication Protocol. This scheme offers the better 
key distribution and node authenticity. It is efficient 
security mechanism for large scale distributed sensor 
networks [3]. The basic idea behind the LEAP method 
is the master key is erased after the pair wise key is 
established using LEAP method. It increases the 
resilience but newly added node still has a master key, 
so more chance for the master key is being 
compromised. 
          Perrig et al. (2001) proposed SPINS: Security 
Protocols for Sensor Networks. In this scheme the 
base station assign encrypted pairwise key for two 
sensor nodes using shared keys [4]. This scheme 
provides perfect resilience but it has poor scalability 
because the base station needs to send the pairwise 
keys to sensors node.   
          Chan and Perrig (2005) proposed PIKE: Peer 
Intermediaries for Key Establishment in sensor 
networks [5]. In this scheme the key establishments 
between two sensor nodes are based on trusted third 
parties. Major limitation of this scheme was trusted 
node may be target of attack or possibilities of 
compromised by adversary. 
B.  Pairwise Key Establishment  
           In this scheme establishing pair wise key 
between each and every pair of nodes in a sensor field. 
If there are n numbers of nodes in a network every 
node in the network will have store n-1 keys. This 
scheme provides good connectivity, confidentiality 
and authenticity for wireless sensor networks. The 
major limitation of this scheme is poor scalability and 
memory. If there are n nodes in the network (the value 
of n is too large) every node store n-1 keys in its 
memory, so it need more memory. Also 
communication between every pair of sensor node is 
not vital for wireless sensor network.  
        Chan and perrig (2003) proposed  Random pair 
wise key predistribution scheme .In this scheme, all 
nodes in a sensor field need not to store n-1 keys for 
establish the pair wise key [6]. Different pair wise 
keys are predistributed randomly in sensor nodes 
before deployment. In this approach, two nodes share 
a pairwise key with high resilience and authentication. 
Even if one sensor node is captured, the keys of other 
nodes are never compromised. The disadvantage is 
that, it does not allow node addition of sensor node in 
the network because existing node do not have 
pairwise keys of newly added sensor nodes. It does 
not have scalability because each sensor has to store 
keys as many as the total number of the sensors in the 
network. 
        The key predistribution schemes can be further 
classified into probabilistic and deterministic based on 
existence of one or more common keys between pair 
of sensor nodes is not sure in the network. 
C.  Probabilistic/Random key predistribution schemes 
         In this scheme the probability of existence of 
common keys between the intermediate nodes is not 
sure but it is probabilistically predicted. The basic idea 
of this scheme is to construct a global key pool and 
randomly choose the keys (i.e., key ring) from the key 
pool (i.e., key size) and preload the keys in sensor 
nodes before deployment (off-line).The major 
advantage of this scheme is, it improve the network 
resilience and thwart node compromise.  
        The basic random key predistribution scheme is 
EG scheme, Eschenauer and Gligor (2002) proposed a 
key management scheme for distributed sensor 
networks [7]. It was the first basic key predistribution 
scheme for many of the research works. This scheme 
is especially designed for sensor networks.  
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        There are three phases in the EG scheme: Key 
predistribution, shared key discovery and path key 
establishment. In the key predistribution phase, 
generate a large pool of keys and randomly pick up n 
keys from the pool to establish a key ring, where n << 
N, where N is the total number of nodes. Each sensor 
node in the network has unique key ring, it consist of 
subset of keys. 
        In the shared key discovery phase, once sensor 
nodes are deployed in the field, the sensor nodes tries 
to communicate with the neighbour node by searching 
common key within the key ring by broadcasting the 
unique identities of the keys ring that stored in 
memory. If there is no common between two sensors 
nodes, path key establishment take place. In this phase 
the communication take place through intermediate 
node, which is able to find communications with the 
both nodes. The path key is unused key of the sensor 
node and connecting nodes.  
       This scheme ensures that though the size of the 
network is large, only a few keys are needed to be 
stored in each node’s memory, thereby saving storage 
space. These few keys are enough to establish the 
common key between the nodes based on a selected 
probability. After deployment, each node tries to 
discover its neighbour node with which it shares 
common keys by broadcast their identifiers lists to 
other nodes. A link establishes between two nodes 
only if they share a common key .If sensor nodes 
failed to shares a common key, which make use of 
path key establishment it provide  a link between two 
nodes when they do not share a common key.                
        The advantage of EG scheme is, it needs fewer 
places to store key ring in its memory and scalable 
because number of keys in the pool and the size of the 
key ring are adjustable. The disadvantage of this 
scheme is poor authentication, connectivity and no 
key refreshing. The key refreshing or key revocation is 
required if a sensor node is compromised  .The EG 
scheme does not support any clustering operation 
because every node should guaranteed to have 
common key with all of its neighbours.      
       Chan and Perrig (2003) suggested two schemes to 
improve the resilience of the basic scheme. The first 
scheme is q-composite scheme and second one is 
multi path key reinforcement. The q- composite key 
scheme is extension of EG scheme. The resilience of 
the network is increased by use of multiple keys 
instead of single key in basic scheme. In EG scheme, 
each sensor node is preloaded with a key ring that is 
randomly chosen from key pool before sensor 
deployment. After sensor node deployment, the shared 
key discovery and path key establishment are remain 
same as basic scheme only difference is instead of 
sharing single common key ,q common keys in the 
key rings are shared to construct the  shared key. For 
example: q=2, at least two keys should be shared from 
key ring. If two keys are not shared from the key rings, 
they are not connected                             
 D.  Matrix based key predistribution Scheme: 
       Blom.R (1985) proposed an optimal Class of 
Symmetric key Generation Systems. It is matrix based 
group key predistribution scheme and not especially 
designed for wireless sensor networks [8]. In this 
scheme, generate the symmetric matrix D whose 
dimension is (λ+1) * (λ+1) .The matrix D works as a 
secret key and should be kept as secret. The matrix G 
is publicly known. The symmetric matrix K, where K 
= (DG)
 T 
G stores all pairwise keys of a group of n 
nodes. (DG)
T
 is called secret matrix and must be kept 
secret to all nodes. The G matrix is given by, 
Let K = (DG)
 T   
and A=K.G, anyone can easily 
compute the symmetric matrix A as follows: 







      Each node i stores the i
th
 row of secret matrix D 
and the i
 th
 column of public matrix G. After sensor 
node deployment, each pair of nodes i and j compute 
the pairwise key Kij =Kji by only exchanging their 
columns in plain text because the key is product of 
their own row and column of others. Here row is 
always secret. Blom’s scheme has λ – secure property, 
which ensures that as long as no more than λ nodes are 
compromised the network can be secure.  In this 
scheme, any pair of sensor nodes in a network is able 
to find a pairwise secret key with neighbors within the 
communication range. The main limitation of Blom’s 
scheme is, if adversaries compromised more than λ 
nodes or rows; the entire secret matrix can be obtained 
by compromiser and the connectivity is poor. 
         Du W, Han (2004) proposed a key management 
scheme for wireless sensor networks combined with 
the Blom’s scheme and the basic scheme [9]. The 
blom’s scheme uses one key space for all nodes which 
guarantees that any pair of nodes can find a pairwise 
key in the key space. In this scheme using multiple 
key spaces by first generating ɷ key spaces using 
bloms scheme and each sensor nodes carries key 
information from randomly selected key spaces. If two 
sensor nodes have common key space, they compute 
pairwise key from the key information from a 
common space; when two sensor nodes do not have 
common key space, they can conduct key agreement 
via other intermediate nodes which share pairwise 
keys with them. The main improvement of this 
scheme is more resilient than blom scheme without 
increasing the amount of memory. The resilience is 
further improved by using two hop neighbor key 
predistribution schemes. The limitation of this scheme 
is to increase the security, it needs more memory. 
        Hangyang Dai et al. (2010) proposed new key 
predistribution scheme using LU matrix method [10]. 
This method combines LU matrix and polynomial 
based key predistribution tactic to achieve high 
resilience and connectivity. First the base station 
generates a large polynomial pool using Blundo et al. 
[10] and each polynomial has a unique ID. Each node 
randomly chooses polynomial from the pool. The LU 
matrix is formed by randomly choose the group of 
polynomial from the polynomial pool to form a lower 
triangular matrix L and the upper triangular matrix 
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U .The product of L and U matrix is symmetric matrix. 
Then the polynomials are predistributed to sensor 
node and randomly distribute the one row and one 
column to each sensor node. Then the keys are shared 
by exchanging their row elements of sensor node and 
compute vector product. If the symmetric condition is 
satisfied; it shared the key between the sensor nodes 
and the mutual authentication is achieved. 
E.  Polynomial Pool based key predistribution Scheme 
      The basic polynomial key predistribution scheme 
is proposed by Blundo et al. (1992) [10].The 
polynomial based scheme is the foundation of 
pairwise key predistribution schemes. In this scheme, 
there are three phases: initialization, key discovery 
and key generalization phase.  
       In the key generalization phases, key set up server 
randomly generates a bivariate t-degree polynomial 
  symmetric polynomial over 
a finite field Qp where p is a prime number that is large 
and it has the property of f(x, y) =f(y, x).In the 
initialization phase, each node has a unique id and set 
up server computes a polynomial share of f(x, y).For 
example: each sensor node i, server computes a 
polynomial share of f(x,y) that is f(i,y).For any sensor 
nodes i and node j can compute the common key f(i,j) 
by calculating f(i, y) at point j and node j can compute 
the common key with i by calculating f(i,y) at i.  
     The main limitation of this scheme is each sensor 
node i needs to store a t-degree polynomial f (i, x) 
which inhabits (λ+1) log p storage space. The pairwise 
key is obtained by the two sensor nodes need to 
evaluate the polynomial for the ID of the other sensor 
node i.e., f (i, y) and f(x, j).This scheme has more 
secure and λ-collusion resistant. Suppose the sensor 
network size is increased, the network is more 
defenceless to attack. 
The general polynomial pool based key predistribution 
scheme greatly reduces the amount of predistributed 
key information stored in sensor nodes and it allows 
every pair of sensor nodes to compute a shared key. 
The main advantage of this scheme is as long as λ or 
fewer nodes are compromised the rest of the network 
is remaining secure. So this scheme is λ-Collusion 
resistant.  
       
III. ASYMMETRIC KEY MANAGEMENT 
SCHEME 
The asymmetric key management or Public key 
cryptography is one of the cryptographic techniques 
which consist of private and public key. Existing 
public key cryptography technique are DES, AES, 
DSA and RSA provides secure communication. These 
cryptographic techniques require larger key size to 
provide higher level of security. So these techniques 
are not suitable for wireless sensor networks. 
        It requires more computational power and more 
processing time for encryption and decryption of data. 
RSA algorithm was first developed in 1977[12].The 
key sizes used in the RSA algorithm is 512 to 2048 
bits. This modular multiplication can lower the 
computation time by almost ¾ and complexity by 25%. 
         Recently Elliptic Curve Cryptography has been 
proposed for wireless sensor network. It has fast 
communication time, smaller keys (i.e., need less 
memory) and bandwidth than RSA [13].A MICA2 
mote using ECC can   reduce the key size. It provides 
same secure as Diffie-Hellman scheme.   
A.  Key Management using ECC 
ECC was first developed by Koblitz and miller in 
1985.ECC is represented using Elliptic curves. It 
provides same level of security when compared to 
RSA but with smaller Key Size [14].eg:160 bit for 
ECC and 1024 bit for RSA. The main advantages of 
ECC are less number of key sizes, reduced memory 
and power and low bandwidth. There are three phases 
in ECC based on hexagonal deployment knowledge. 
Phases 1: Key Generation Phase (Generation of seed 
key) 
• Elliptic curve over finite field is given by 





+ax+bmodp   where a,b 
-Elliptic curve coefficients and p-prime field.  
E.g.: Consider N=50, p=53,a=9 and b=17. 
• Then elliptic curve equation: y2=x3+9x+17  
• 52 Elliptic curve points have been generated. 
Each node is assigned with a unique seed key 
Phase: 2 Key predistribution phase 
     In this phase key ring is generated by point 
doubling and point multiplication operation over the 
seed keys and it is pre-distributed into the sensor 
nodes. The formula used to calculate is x2p=(λ
2
-
2xp)modp and  y2p=(λ(xp-x2p)-yp)modp ; where, 
λ=[(3xp
2
+a)/2yp)]modp. Once key ring is formed, it is 
pre-distributed into the sensor nodes before it gets 
deployed into the terrain. 
Phase: 3 Key Agreement Phase (Link Formation)  
      In this link formation phases, link is created when 
two nodes shares a common private key. When the 
size of key ring increases the corresponding link 
increases and vice versa. The probability of two node 
sharing a common key is given by W=1-[(p-r)! / [((p-
2r)!)( p
r
)]], where r is key ring size and p is key pool 
size. The link increases by increasing the key ring size 
r. In this scheme the connectivity and resilience 
analysis is proved that ECC scheme with deployment 
knowledge achieves a higher connectivity and security 
with a shorter transmission range and a lower memory 
requirement. 
     Du et al. (2009) proposed routing driven ECC 
based key management scheme for WSN [14] .In this 
scheme a heterogeneous sensor network is used to 
provide better performance and security. It establishes 
shared keys with neighbour sensor nodes that 
communicate with each other.   
    Recently the Hyper Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(HECC) is one of emerging cryptographic techniques 
for wireless sensor networks. HECC offers the same 
level of security when compared to RSA and ECC 
with smaller Key Size [14].eg:80 bit for HECC, 160 
bit for ECC and 1024 bit for RSA. 
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IV.CONCLUSION 
 The key Management schemes for wireless 
sensor networks are still an active research area. It 
provides fundamental security for wireless sensor 
network. In this paper, various key management 
techniques have been surveyed and investigated based 
on encryption and then divide each classification into 
several group based on key predistribution and key 
establishment. Mainly all the key management 
schemes are designed based on the limited resource of 
sensor nodes and its security. Key Management 
scheme for WSNs is still a very fruitful research 
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